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Abstract: Despite being the first Asian economy to achieve modern economic growth, Japan 
has received relatively little attention in the Great Divergence debate. New estimates suggest 
that although the level of GDP per capita remained below the level of northwest Europe 
throughout the period 730-1874, Japan experienced positive trend growth before 1868, in 
contrast to the negative trend growth experienced in China and India, leading to a Little 
Divergence within Asia. However, growth in Japan remained slower than in northwest Europe 
so that Japan continued to fall behind until after the institutional reforms of the early Meiji 
period. The Great Divergence thus occurred as the most dynamic part of Asia fell behind the 
most dynamic part of Europe. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Before the publication of Angus Maddison’s (2001), The World Economy: A Millennial 
Perspective, most accounts of economic growth before the nineteenth century were largely 
qualitative. Although Maddison’s estimates have been influential, they were based largely on 
conjecture rather than built up from contemporary data. Maddison himself was well aware that 
many parts of Europe and Asia during the medieval and early modern periods were quite 
literate and numerate, and left behind an abundance of documents containing information that 
could be turned into estimates of population and economic activity. Indeed, in an edited 
collection from the World Economic History Congress in Milan, Maddison and van der Wee 
(1994) provided some preliminary studies in historical national accounting that went back to 
1086 in England, to 1500 in Flanders and Brabant and to 1580 in Spain (Snooks, 1994; Blomme 
and van der Wee, 1994; Yun, 1994). However, these studies were only very loosely 
incorporated into Maddison (2001: 244-265), where many of the GDP per capita estimates 
before 1500 are around $400 in 1990 international prices, connected up to the 1820 estimates 
using assumed growth rates based on a reading of the qualitative literature. The figure of $400 
is seen as subsistence income, based on the assumption that most people existed at the World 
Bank poverty level of $1 per day (in 1990 prices), with a small rich elite pulling up the average 
from $365. It is important to understand that Maddison intended his estimates for the pre-
modern period to be a starting point and indeed encouraged other scholars to engage in 
historical national accounting using contemporary data, with a view to improving his estimates, 
just as he had already done for the modern period in a remarkable stream of publications from 
Maddison (1982) to Maddison (1995).  
 
 Maddison’s pathbreaking study has stimulated much progress in historical national 
accounting for medieval and early modern Europe, with annual estimates now available back 
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as far as 1300 for Britain, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Sweden and France and back to 1500 
for Portugal and Germany (Broadberry et al., 2015a; van Zanden and van Leeuwen, 2012; 
Malanima, 2011; Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura, 2013; Schön and Kranz, 2012; 
Krantz, 2017; Ridolfi, 2017; Pfister, 2015; Palma and Reis, 2017). For Asia, progress has been 
rather slower, as there is less of a tradition of collecting data and processing it within an 
economic framework on which to build. Nevertheless studies have now appeared for China 
and India based on contemporary data, showing substantial differences from Maddison’s 
(2001) conjectures (Broadberry et al., 2018; Xu et al., 2017; Broadberry et al., 2015b). Japan, 
Asia’s most successful economy, has been missing from this new database. 
 
In this paper, we provide the first estimates based on contemporary data of long term 
growth for Japan over the period 730-1874. These estimates have important implications for 
the debate over the Great Divergence of productivity and living standards between Europe and 
Asia. Following the claim of Pomeranz (2000) that China did not fall behind the West until 
after 1800, most attention on the Asian side has been focused on China, with a smaller amount 
of literature devoted to the case of India, following the work of Parthasarathi (1998; 2011). 
However, a similar debate had in fact taken place over the position of Japan nearly two decades 
earlier, following the work of Hanley (1983; 1986). Hanley (1983) argued that Japanese living 
standards were as high as in the West until the nineteenth century. Furthermore, the case for 
Japan as the most likely Asian economy to be on a par with Europe in the early modern period 
is given credence by the fact that Japan was the first Asian economy to make the transition to 
modern economic growth in Asia after the Meiji Restoration of 1868, and went on to catch up 
with Western levels of per capita GDP in the twentieth century while China and India fell 
further behind. Although Hanley’s (1983) claim of Japanese parity with the West until the 
nineteenth century was quickly criticised by Yasuba (1986) before fading from view, the idea 
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of Japan following an exceptional path within Asia, sharing many characteristics with the 
European path, was already firmly established within the economic history literature and has 
remained strong (Smith, 1959; Dore, 1965; Nakamura, 1966; Hayami et al., 1999). Indeed, the 
later volumes of the Cambridge Economic History of Europe even went so far as to include 
separate chapters on Japan in providing a comprehensive overview of “European” development 
(Mathias and Postan, 1978; Mathias and Pollard, 1989). Adding Japan to the database means 
that for the first time, we can examine quantitatively the underlying differences between China, 
India and Japan which may help to shed light on why Japan caught up with Europe in the 
twentieth century, while India and China lagged behind. 
 
The results presented here suggest that Japan experienced substantial GDP per capita 
growth before 1868, thus providing a firm base for the first Asian transition to modern 
economic growth following the Meiji restoration of that year. Inevitably, with the current state 
of knowledge, the estimates lack precision. There are undoubtedly fewer sources for Asian 
economies than for European economies such as Britain and the Netherlands. Furthermore, 
those sources that are available have been subjected to less critical scrutiny by economic 
historians. To deal with this uncertainty, we provide data reliability assessments and sensitivity 
analysis. Here, we build upon the subjective error margins approach used by Farris (2006; 
2009a) for Japanese population and agricultural output. This approach has also been used in 
historical national accounting studies for other countries (Feinstein and Thomas 2002; van 
Zanden and van Leeuwen, 2012; Broadberry et al., 2018). We also consider the robustness of 
our main findings to alternative scenarios. 
 
The central estimates suggest Malthusian fluctuations in Japan during the ancient 
period, with positive per capita income growth during periods of falling population and 
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negative per capita income growth during periods of rising population. This was followed by 
positive trend growth of per capita income in Japan between 1280 and 1874, with most of the 
growth occurring in two phases, between 1450 and 1600 during the medieval period, and after 
1721 during the Tokugawa period. Although there is a qualitative literature to support the idea 
of late medieval growth, the width of the error bands during the medieval period suggests 
caution should be exercised until further quantitative evidence becomes available to confirm 
this finding (Nagahara, 1981; Farris, 2006). For the Tokugawa period, however, the case for 
trend growth is stronger since it is based upon a much larger amount of contemporary 
quantitative information as well as an extensive qualitative literature that supports this 
interpretation (Nakamura, 1968; Hayami et al., 2004). Although our estimates suggest that 
Japan was improving its relative position within Asia during the Tokugawa period, growth in 
Japan remained slower than in northwest Europe. As a result, Japan continued to fall behind 
the leading European economies until after the Meiji Restoration. The Great Divergence thus 
occurred as the most dynamic part of Asia fell behind the most dynamic part of Europe. 
 
2. POPULATION 
Historical demographic data allow the estimation of total population for Japan back to around 
730. The data in Table 1 are taken from a number of sources that have been cross-checked and 
made consistent, covering the ancient, medieval and Tokugawa periods (Saito and Takashima, 
2017a; 2017b). Due to the limited availability of primary sources for premodern Japan, it is not 
possible to construct an annual series, so data are provided for a number of benchmark years. 
For the ancient period (710-1192), data are presented for 730, 950 and 1150, while for the 
medieval period (1192-1600), the benchmark years are 1280 and 1450. For the Tokugawa 
period (1600-1868), data are provided for 1600, 1721, 1804 and 1846. These estimates are 
linked up to a benchmark for 1874, early in the Meiji period (1868-1912).  Here we provide a 
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brief description of the sources and methods for the estimation of the population benchmarks, 
with further details set out in the Appendix.  
 
2.1 Ancient period 
For the ancient period, the estimates of Farris (2009a) are derived ultimately from information 
on the number and average size of villages (for the year 730) or the cultivated area together 
with the amount of land needed to provide sufficient food to support a person (for the years 
950 and 1150). For 730, Farris reworks the estimates of Sawada (1927) and Kamata (1984), 
based on the number of gō (villages or administrative units consisting of 50 households) in 
Rissho zanpen, an ancient penal statute compiled in the first half of the eighth century (Kondo, 
1969). The number of villages is multiplied by the number of people living in an average village 
in the first half of the eighth century, supplemented by an allowance for urban dwellers and 
slaves. This yields a range of 5.8 to 6.4 million for the population in 730, shown in Table 1. 
 
 For 950, Farris (2009a: 23-24) reworks the figures of Kito (1983), who based his 
population estimates on the cultivated area from Wamyōshō, an ancient Japanese encyclopaedia 
compiled in the first half of the tenth century (Kyoto Daigaku Bungakubu Kokugogaku 
Kokubungaku Kenkyūshitsu, 1968), and information on the amount of land required to support 
one person in the mid-tenth century. This yields the maximum figure of 5.6 million in Table 1. 
For the minimum figure of 4.4 million in 950, Farris (2009a: 4, 24) used information from a 
Tōdaiji monk Chonen, who arrived at the Chinese court in 983 with documents showing the 
number of administrative villages. 
 
 Farris (2009a: 24-26) also provides a range for the population of Japan in 1150. His 
starting point is again the work of Kito (1983), who based his estimates on the cultivated area 
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recorded in Shūgaishō, an old Japanese encyclopaedia compiled in the early medieval period 
(Iyanaga, 1980). Because there is uncertainty over whether or not the cultivated area  includes 
all land that was actually in cultivation or just rice paddies, Farris provides a range of between 
5.5 and 6.3 million for the population in 1150. 
 
 Table 1 also includes some alternative estimates from Kito (1996; 2000) covering the 
years 725, 900 and 1150. Although it would be possible to argue that they have been superseded 
by the estimates of Farris, which reworked the same basic information under different 
assumptions, they are included here since they fall outside the range given by Farris. Note that 
encompassing Kito’s alternative estimates would increase the error range for 730 and 950 from 
±5% to 12% to around ±17% to 18%. We will return to the issue of error margins later in the 
paper when considering the robustness of our results. 
 
2.2 Medieval period 
For the medieval period, the estimates are also taken from the work of Farris (2006). For 1280, 
a link to the cultivated area in the ancient period is established using a sample of land registers 
and combined with information on the amount of land per person needed to support life (Farris, 
2006: 22-26). For 1450, the population is estimated by establishing the number of soldiers, 
applying a ratio of soldiers to the rural population and making an allowance for the urban 
population (Farris, 2006: 95-98). This figure is then cross-checked against Osamu Saito’s 
extrapolation back from the first national census estimate of 1721 (Farris, 2006: 98-100; Saito 
and Takashima, 2017a). Again, Farris provides a range of estimates for 1280 and 1450, which 
are shown in Table 1. 
 
2.3 Tokugawa and early Meiji periods 
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For the Tokugawa period, the population data for 1600 are taken from Saito and Takashima 
(2017a), again projected back from the census figure for 1721. The estimates for 1804 and 
1846 are based on further national surveys, reworked by Kito (1996).  For the early Meiji 
period, the 1874 level is taken from Fukao et al. (2015). Farris (2006) provides an error range 
of around ±5% for most years before 1600, but with a higher range of ±12% for 950. Because 
the population figures for the Tokugawa and early Meiji periods are rooted in national surveys, 
the maximum and minimum figures have also been set at 5% above and below the benchmark 
estimates.  
 
2.4 Overview of population growth 
To be credible, estimates of population must also produce reasonable average annual rates of 
growth between benchmark years, so Table 1 also provides data on the annual rate of growth 
of population in panel B. Over the entire period 730-1874, Japanese population grew at a 
relatively modest annual rate of 0.15 per cent using our main series, or 0.18 per cent using the 
alternative series for the ancient period. However, much of the population growth was 
concentrated in the period 1280-1721, with periods of much slower growth before 1280 and 
again after 1721.  
 
The stagnation of the population between 730 and 1280 is easily understood in the 
context of a high frequency of famines, which kept mortality rates high (Saito, 2015: 215). The 
strong population growth from 1280 is consistent with the decline in the frequency of famines 
from one every three years in the ancient period to one every four years during the medieval 
period (Saito, 2015: 216). Also, with the failure of the Mongol invasion from China in the late 
thirteenth century preserving Japan’s isolation from the Eurasian mainland, Japan avoided the 
major population decline that hit China and most European countries with the arrival of the 
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Black Death in the mid-fourteenth century (McNeil, 1976). Although population growth may 
have been expected to slow down between 1450 and 1600 because of the conflict of the 
Warring States Period, Saito (2015) notes that this effect was offset by a further decline in the 
frequency of famines to one every eight years, as a result of an increase in direct control of the 
land by feudal lords, making it easier to respond to harvest failures (Saito and Takashima, 
2017a). 
 
Turning to the slower population growth after 1721, Saito (2015: 214) notes that despite 
the continued downward trend in the number of famines per century, Japan could not escape 
from disasters completely, and the Tenmei famine of the 1780s and the Tenpō famine of the 
1830s took their toll. This shows up here in the absolute fall in the population level between 
1721 and 1804, and a positive rate of population growth between 1804 and 1874 that remained 
well below the peak growth of the early Tokugawa period. It should nevertheless be noted that 
population continued to increase in western Japan, where proto-industry and agriculture 
continued to prosper. The population decline was thus driven by trends in eastern Japan, which 
fell behind the proto-industrialising western parts of the country and was hit by famines as a 
result of cold weather and economic stagnation (Hayami and Kito, 2004: 221-222).  
 
3. AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT FROM THE SUPPLY SIDE 
Agricultural output can be estimated directly from the supply side, using data on crops 
harvested or the amount of land used for crop production multiplied by crop yields. This can 
then be cross-checked against estimates of the demand for food derived indirectly from data on 
population, wages and prices. Starting with the supply-side estimates, the precise method of 
estimation varies by period. For the ancient and medieval periods, agricultural output is derived 
from data on the amount of arable land in use, multiplied by estimates of the productivity of 
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land. For the period 1600-1874, by contrast, the most reliable data are for total production and 
land use, with land productivity derived from these two series. Here we provide a brief guide 
to the construction of the supply side estimates for the ancient, medieval and Tokugawa 
periods, with further details included in the Appendix. 
 
3.1 Ancient period 
For the ancient period, under the Ritsuryō legal code, which treated people and land as public 
property, all persons were recorded in a family register and land was distributed to farmers on 
the basis of the size and the composition of the household in terms of age, sex and social status. 
Farmers cultivated their allotted fields (kubunden) and paid land tax to the government in the 
form of rice, together with various poll taxes. To maintain the system, the allotment of land 
was revised, in principle, every six years. Sufficient data have survived from this period to 
allow the estimation of agricultural output from the amount of arable land in use, multiplied by 
the productivity of land for the benchmark years 730 during the Nara period, and 950 and 1150 
during the early and late Heian periods, respectively.  
 
 For the Nara period, the arable land area is calculated separately for paddy and non-
paddy fields. The paddy field area is obtained from the number of gō (villages or administrative 
units consisting of 50 households) multiplied by an estimate of the paddy field area per gō. The 
number of gō is taken from Rissho zanpen in Koten Hozonkai (1934), an ancient penal code. 
The paddy field area per gō is taken from the breakdown of the paddy field area of the 14 gō 
in the Sagami no kuni fukoso koekichō [Books of trade and household taxes in Sagami 
Province] in Kunaichō (1988) for the year 735. The non-paddy field area is obtained from the 
share of non-paddy fields in the total landholdings of Gufukuji and Horyuji temples. Land 
productivity is also calculated separately for paddy and non-paddy fields based on 
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contemporary legal and land-related documents. The allocation of paddy fields followed a legal 
formula known as shichibun-hō, according to which land tracts were divided into high, 
medium, low, and very low grades, allotted in seven parts based on the formula 1:2:2:2. The 
Ordinances of Engi [Engi-shiki] (Kuroita, 2011b), give productivity figures on these grades of 
land. The productivity of non-paddy land relative to paddy land is obtained from the relative 
price of the two types of land. Engi-shiki (Kuroita, 2011b) records an average ratio of 0.64 for 
the relative price of non-paddy fields. Table 2 shows the range of values for the arable land 
area, land productivity and agricultural output for paddy and non-paddy fields in the Nara 
period. Figures in parentheses are the average values which serve as our benchmark estimates, 
with the range providing error margins, as with the population data. 
 
 For the Heian period, the arable land area is again calculated separately for paddy and 
non-paddy fields. The paddy field area is recorded in the various volumes of Wamyōshō for the 
early Heian period and the various volumes of Shūgaishō for the late Heian period. Research 
by Iyanaga (1980) suggests that the paddy field area recorded in these sources provides a good 
reflection of the situation in the early and late Heian periods. The non-paddy field area is 
estimated from the non-paddy share of landholdings in land documents for individual temples 
and shrines (Takeuchi, 1964-76). Land productivity in paddy fields is derived from legal and 
land documents available in Kuroita (2011a; 2011b) for the early Heian period and Takeuchi 
(1964-76) for the late Heian period. For non-paddy fields in the Heian period, land productivity 
is derived using information on the price of non-paddy fields relative to the price of paddy 
fields, as for the Nara period (Takeuchi, 1964-76). Note that the increase in the share of non-
paddy fields from just under 20 per cent in the Nara period to around 40 per cent in the Heian 
period led to a fall in overall land productivity of around 15 per cent, since paddy fields were 
around 75 per cent more productive. 
12 
 
 
 The data for the early and late Heian periods are again set out in Table 2. The figures 
in parentheses in Table 2 represent our benchmark estimates, with the degree of uncertainty 
indicated by the ranges in each column. A number of adjustments have been made to the raw 
data to make them comparable with the data from other periods. First, the data in the original 
sources are given in Nara units, which must be converted to Tokugawa units, with 1 Nara chō 
equal to 1.2 Tokugawa chō and 1 Nara koku equal to 2.5 Tokugawa koku. Second, the arable 
land area must be adjusted to allow for fallowed and abandoned land. This share is estimated 
separately for paddy and non-paddy fields from contemporary land documents, and indicates 
that around 40 per cent of arable land in the ancient period was not cultivated (Takeuchi, 1964-
76). The land productivity estimates have been increased by the same proportion, leaving 
output as implied by the unadjusted data. 
 
3.2 Medieval period 
For the medieval period, the absence of a unified government, in contrast to the Ritsuryō system 
of the ancient period, means that there is more limited availability of systematic data on the 
cultivated area and land productivity. Here, we have made use of the work of Farris (2006: 
263), who derived total arable land by multiplying the population by estimates of arable land 
per capita obtained from primary sources. These estimates are then multiplied by grain yields 
from the same sources to yield agricultural output. However, it should be noted that although 
data are available on all three elements of population, arable land per capita and land 
productivity for 1450, for 1280 we lack data on arable land per capita. Farris filled in this gap 
by assuming that arable output per capita was the same in both years, so that arable land per 
capita declined as land productivity increased.  
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 We have reworked Farris’s figures to incorporate additional information on land 
productivity from the work of Nishitani (2015), who estimated the productivity of paddy fields 
in villages of the Kinai region (around Kyoto) between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries. 
Allowance is made for the fact that land productivity was higher than average in the Kinai 
region when estimating land productivity for Japan as a whole.1 Table 3 summarises the more 
detailed information provided in the Appendix, setting out the benchmark estimates of arable 
land, land productivity and agricultural output. Additional information is provided on 
population to highlight the fact that Farris derived his 1280 figure for arable land per capita by 
assuming that arable output per capita was the same in both years. It will therefore be 
particularly important for this period to cross-check the supply-side results with the demand-
side estimates obtained in section 4. 
 
3.3 Tokugawa and early Meiji periods 
For the Tokugawa period from 1600 the most reliable data are for total agricultural production 
and land use, with land productivity derived from these two series. Under the kokudaka system 
of the Tokugawa shogunate, lands were valued for taxation purposes in terms of their capacity 
for producing rice, expressed in koku, with one koku approximately equal to 150 kg. Here, we 
extend the approach of Nakamura (1968), who established the reliability of output benchmarks 
in the Shōhō period (1644-1648) and in the early years of the Meiji period (1877-79). 
Nakamura also made innovative use of the number of land improvement projects recorded in 
the History of Civil Engineering Works as a variable to interpolate agricultural output in a 
number of intervening periods. However, whereas Nakamura (1968) worked at the level of 
                                                           
1 Given that land productivity in medieval Kyoto and its surrounding area was concentrated in the range from 10 
to 16 to/tan, we assume that the average land productivity in Japan as a whole fell in the range from 7 to 10 
koku/chō (see Appendix Tables A10 and A11). 
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Japan as a whole, we recalculate the output changes at the level of 14 regions, using the same 
1644 benchmark, but a slightly different 1874 benchmark from Naimushō Kangyōryō (1875) 
Meiji 7-nen fuken bussan-hyō [Tables of Prefectural Products, Meiji 7]. A further adjustment 
is needed to bring the official figures of arable output into line with the output of the primary 
sector as a whole in the early Meiji period, as calculated by Fukao et al. (2015). This involves 
both correcting for the under-recording of arable output in the official statistics and allowing 
for other primary production, including livestock, forestry and fisheries. 
 
 The arable land area is estimated for the key benchmark years using official statistical 
sources for 1874 and a nationwide cadastral survey for 1721. For other years, a large number 
of county and village level cadastral surveys are available for use in interpolation. As with the 
agricultural output data, a correction factor is applied to the official data to bring them into line 
with the post-1874 estimates from Umemura et al. (1966). Table 4 provides the benchmark 
estimates for the Tokugawa and early Meiji periods, keeping a clear distinction between 
agricultural output and primary sector output.  
 
3.4 Overview of the agricultural output estimates from the supply side 
The benchmark estimates of Japanese agricultural production for the whole period 730-1874 
are set out in summary form in Table 5. The arable land area is given in the first column, while 
the second column shows agricultural land productivity. The third column gives agricultural 
production in 1,000 koku, while the fourth column gives the series for agricultural production 
per head, obtained by dividing agricultural production by the average population series from 
Table 1. The fifth column presents the agricultural production per head data in index number 
form, based on 1874=100.  
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 Using these benchmark estimates, agricultural production grew at an annual rate of 0.21 
per cent between 730 and 1874, with more than four-fifths of the growth coming from an 
extension of the arable area, and the other one-fifth from rising land productivity. However, 
most of the output growth was needed merely to keep up with the increasing population, with 
the period before the nineteenth century characterized by Malthusian fluctuations. Per capita 
agricultural output tended to increase when population was declining or growing only slowly, 
but then tended to fall back in periods of rapid population growth. The Pearson correlation 
coefficient between the growth of agricultural output per head from panel B of Table 5 and 
population growth from panel B of Table 1 is strongly negative, at -0.49. During the nineteenth 
century, however, growth of agricultural output per head was accompanied by positive 
population growth, as Japan began to break free from the Malthusian trap. Alternative 
scenarios, making use of error margins, will be used later to assess the robustness of these 
findings. 
 
4. AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT FROM THE DEMAND SIDE 
An alternative way of estimating agricultural output is to infer it from a demand function for 
food, using known trends in wages and prices. This approach can be traced back at least as far 
as the work of Crafts (1985), who calculated the path of agricultural output in Britain during 
the Industrial Revolution with income and price elasticities derived from the experience of later 
developing countries. The approach was developed further by Allen (2000) using consumer 
theory. Allen (2000: 13-14) starts with the identity: 
         (1) 
where QA is real agricultural output, r is the ratio of production to consumption, c is 
consumption per head and N is population. Real agricultural consumption per head is assumed 
to be a function of its own price in real terms (PA/P), the price of non-agricultural goods and 
rcNQ A =
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services in real terms (PNA/P), and real income per head (y). Assuming a log-linear 
specification, we have: 
     (2) 
where α1 and α2 are the own-price and cross-price elasticities of demand, β is the income 
elasticity of demand and α0 is a constant. Consumer theory requires that the own-price, cross-
price and income elasticities should sum to zero, which sets tight constraints on the plausible 
values, particularly given the accumulated evidence on elasticities in developing countries 
(Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980: 15-16, 60-82).2 
 
4.1 Real wages and the demand for food in Japan 
For early modern Europe, Allen (2000: 14) works with an own-price elasticity of -0.6 and a 
cross-price elasticity of 0.1, which constrains the income elasticity to be 0.5. Allen also 
assumes that agricultural consumption is equal to agricultural production. For the case of Japan, 
where more limited information is available, we implement a restricted version using the rice 
wage (the daily wage divided by the price of rice) for unskilled labourers and an assumed 
income elasticity of 0.5.3 One way to justify this would be if the cross-price elasticity is zero 
and real income is the wage divided by the overall price level. The demand function then 
becomes:  
 ln 𝑐 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑙𝑛(𝑃
𝐴/𝑃) + 𝛽 ln(𝑊/𝑃)    (3) 
                                                           
2 Although this approach is widely applied to peasant economies on the assumption that a bad harvest in the 
market sector also affects the non-market sector, it should be noted that the behaviour of crop prices potentially 
affects the income of commercial farmers differently. However, for the period 1885-1913, when data on all 
agricultural incomes are available, agricultural wages were highly correlated with other agricultural incomes 
(Fukao et al., 2017, Appendix Table 2). 
3 Many studies of developing economies in different eras find an income elasticity of demand for food in the range 
between 0.4 and 0.6 (Allen, 2000; Bouis, 1994; Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980; Malanima, 2011). 
yPPPPc NAA ln)/ln()/ln(ln 210  +++=
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The own-price elasticity must then equal the negative of the real wage elasticity (α1 = -β), so 
that: 
 ln 𝑐 = 𝛼0 − 𝛽𝑙𝑛(𝑃
𝐴/𝑃) + 𝛽 ln(𝑊/𝑃)    (4) 
But then the overall price level used to deflate the wage cancels out with the overall price level 
used to deflate the grain price, leaving a single term in the grain wage: 
 ln 𝑐 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛(𝑊/𝑃
𝐴)    (5) 
The rice wage is taken from Bassino et al. (2010) and Bassino and Ma (2005), and plotted on 
an annual basis in Figure 1, together with the per capita agricultural demand derived using the 
demand approach. The data are drawn largely from the Kinai region, which includes Kyoto 
and Osaka, but there is scattered evidence from other regions to suggest that the rice wage 
series assembled here reflects national trends. 
 
 For the period 1260-1600, rice wages in Kyoto were constructed using information on 
nominal wages and the price of rice expressed in copper coins, or from wages paid directly in 
rice. The nominal wage series was based on wage rates for benchmark years collected by Endo 
(1956) and Tanaka (2007) and on individual contracts reported by Rekihaku (2009). Wages are 
available for a number of different occupations, including carpenters, blacksmiths, dyers, 
needle makers, transportation workers and urban service workers. A common feature of the 
wage data for the different occupations is a clustering of nominal wages at levels of 10, 50 and 
100 copper coins per day, throughout the whole period. This constancy over long periods of 
time is also a feature of money wage series in medieval and early modern Europe (Phelps 
Brown and Hopkins, 1956; Allen, 2001). These clusters at 10, 50 and 100 copper coins per day 
are interpreted as corresponding to different skill levels, with the 10 copper coin level taken as 
the unskilled day wage, paid mainly to urban service workers, transportation workers and the 
unskilled helpers of craftsmen. Skilled wages were paid to a much smaller share of the 
18 
 
population, so that unskilled wages are likely to provide a better indicator of average incomes. 
Throughout the entire period, with the daily nominal wage rate for unskilled workers fixed at 
10 copper coins, the rice wage varied with changes in rice prices. Rice prices in copper coins 
were reported in Momose (1959), Rekihaku (2009), and Kyoto Daigaku Kinsei Bukkashi 
Kenkyūkai (1962). Out of 1,733 price observations in Kyoto Daigaku Kinsei Bukkashi 
Kenkyūkai, 863 state a region, and of these 699 are from the Kinai region, which includes 
Kyoto and Osaka. Of the remaining 163 price quotes which state a region, 69 are from 
Chugoku, 40 from Kanto, 38 from Hokuriku, 6 from Chubu, 6 from Sanyo and 5 from Kyushu. 
These data suggest that rice prices were about 20 per cent lower outside the Kinai region, which 
would have countered any advantage from higher money wages around Kyoto. 
 
 For the period 1600-1743, unskilled wage rates in copper coins were obtained from a 
data series for Osaka, which is available for the whole period 1600-1780 (Miyamoto, 1963). 
For the post-1743 period, rice wages are also available for Kyoto, based on a collection of retail 
prices of rice sold and labour compensation paid by the Kyoto branch of the trading house 
Mitsui (Mitsui Bunko 1981). The Osaka wages were substantially lower than in Kyoto, but 
this, taken together with their stability over long periods, indicates that an in-kind component 
of rice was not included. The Osaka wages were thus adjusted upwards to the Kyoto level by 
assuming that the in-kind component in Osaka was 0.8 shō (1.8 litres per shō, and 1.5 kg in the 
case of husked rice). This adjustment factor was obtained by comparing the Osaka wage series 
for the period 1743-1870 with the series for Kyoto covering the period 1743-1762 and 1791-
1870. The pre-1720 rice price series was generated by projecting backwards the Kyoto Mitsui 
series, assuming the same yearly variation as for wholesale prices in Osaka for 1700-1742 and 
1763-1790, Hiroshima 1620-1700 (Iwahashi, 1981) and Osaka 1600-1650 (Kimura 1987). 
There is evidence to suggest that the trend of real wages in this series from the Kinai region 
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reflected the national trend. Oyaizu (2006) collected micro-data on unskilled wages covering 
most regions of Japan from the mid-eighteenth century, which suggest that wages in the Kinai 
region were no higher than in the rest of the country. Regional rice prices are available on an 
annual basis for sixteen markets during 1720-1857, and indicate that rice prices in western and 
central Japan were closely integrated with the two main markets of Osaka and Edo (Iwahashi, 
1981; Yamasaki, 1983). Although the small markets of eastern Japan were less well integrated, 
the majority of the population lived in western and central Japan (Miyamoto, 1985: 155). 
 
 The daily unskilled rice wage has been converted to an annual basis on the assumption 
of 250 days worked per year and is presented in Figure 1 in terms of koku, for comparison with 
the agricultural demand per head. A koku was intended to be sufficient to feed one person for 
a year, providing around 150 kilograms of rice, or 0.41 kg per day, which provided just over 
2,000 kilocalories. The rice wage remained relatively stable between 1260/69 and 1450/59, 
before roughly doubling to 1550/59 and then slipping back, but remaining on a higher plateau 
than before 1450/59. Agricultural demand per head has been derived from the unskilled rice 
wage on the assumption of an income elasticity of demand of 0.5. The level of agricultural 
demand per head in koku has been calibrated using the supply side estimate for the 1840s of 
1.76 koku. At this point in the late Tokugawa era, the demand for food consumed around 60 
per cent of the annual wage, but the proportion averaged around 80 per cent during the medieval 
period. As we shall see in section 5, these proportions are broadly in line with changes in the 
share of the primary sector in total output. 
 
 One possible shortcoming of the above approach is that the demand for food has been 
derived using only wage income, but in a largely agricultural society, land rent must also have 
been an important component of income. However, a number of observations can be made to 
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suggest that this was not likely to have been a major issue in the Japanese case. For the medieval 
period, Nishitani (2017) argues on the basis of a detailed study of village data that the ratio 
between land rent and the income of the cultivator was stable (at around 1) over time. During 
the Tokugawa period, some of the land rent was replaced by increased taxes for use as payment 
of a rental income to the Samurai class, and thus continued to be consumed (Schreurs, 2016). 
Furthermore, for the period 1885-1913, when data on all agricultural incomes are available, 
agricultural wages and land rents are highly correlated, with a correlation coefficient of 0.89 
(Fukao et al., 2017, Appendix Table 2). 
 
4.2 Agricultural output: supply and demand 
A comparison between agricultural output per capita estimated from both the supply and 
demand sides is given in Figure 2. The supply-side estimates cover a long span of time, but at 
a relatively low frequency, while the demand-side estimates are available at a higher frequency, 
but for a shorter period of time. Both supply and demand estimates suggest a similar increase 
in agricultural output per capita between the late-thirteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries. Both 
estimates also show an increase between 1450 and 1600, followed by a decline during the 
seventeenth century and a return to growth in the eighteenth century. 
 
 As with the population series, we adopt the subjective error margins approach of 
Feinstein and Thomas (2002) to deal with uncertainty over the accuracy of the agricultural 
output data. The error margins for some of the individual components of agricultural supply 
and demand are higher, but the degree of agreement between the two series is reassuring.  
 
5. SECONDARY AND TERTIARY OUTPUT 
5.1 Urbanisation and non-agricultural production 
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A number of authors have used the share of the population living in towns as a measure of the 
growth of the non-agricultural sector. This approach began with Wrigley (1985), and has 
recently been combined with the demand approach to agriculture to provide indirect estimates 
of GDP in a number of European countries during the early modern period (Malanima, 2011; 
Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura, 2013; Schön and Krantz, 2012). With the path of 
agricultural output (QA) derived using equations (1) and (2), overall output (Q) is derived as: 
        (6) 
where the share of non-agricultural output in total output (QNA/Q) is proxied by the urbanisation 
rate. The approach can be made less crude by making an allowance for higher productivity in 
the non-agricultural sector, so that (QNA/Q) increases more than proportionally with the 
urbanisation rate. 
 
However, as Saito and Takashima (2016) point out, there is a major problem with 
applying this method to Japan, because the urbanisation rate declined during the late Tokugawa 
period, which is widely seen as the key period of proto-industrial growth. Data on the Japanese 
urban population are shown in Table 6. The definition of urbanisation chosen here is the 
number of people living in settlements of at least 10,000, in line with the work of de Vries 
(1984) on Europe. The data on the size of individual towns were derived from historical sources 
compiled by local governments in Japan. The urban population share remained relatively stable 
at around 2 or 3 per cent until the mid-fifteenth century, when it increased substantially, 
particularly at the beginning of the Tokugawa shogunate. However, the urbanisation rate then 
remained on a plateau during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries before declining during 
the nineteenth century. The sharp increase in the level of urbanisation at the beginning of the 
Tokugawa period was the result of the introduction of the Bakuhan system, which was based 
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on a principle of separation between peasants in the countryside and warriors in towns, with 
merchants and artisans also being required to reside in towns (Iwahashi, 2004: 88-89). 
However, the separation between peasants and the commercial classes was less strictly 
enforced than that between peasants and the warriors, allowing the growth of proto-industry in 
the countryside (Shimbo and Hasegawa, 2004).  
 
5.2 Allowing for proto-industry 
Under the circumstances outlined above, a crude estimation of non-agricultural production 
using the urbanisation rate would miss the expansion of cottage industry in the rural industrious 
revolution highlighted by Hayami (1967). The solution proposed by Saito and Takashima 
(2016) is to allow secondary and tertiary output to vary with population density as well as the 
urbanisation rate, with the weights for these two factors derived from pooled regional data for 
the years 1874, 1890 and 1909. Population density continued to rise during the late Tokugawa 
period while the urbanisation rate declined, as can be seen in Table 6.  
 
Using data from Fukao et al. (2015), Saito and Takashima (2016) run separate 
regressions for the secondary and tertiary sectors, with the same right hand side variables 
allowed to have different effects on the secondary and tertiary sector shares. The secondary 
sector share variable (Sshare) is defined as the proportion of secondary sector output in the 
sum of primary and secondary sector output, and the regression is run with the dependent 
variable in logit form to deal with the skewness of the distribution: 
𝑙𝑛 (
𝑆𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒
1−𝑆𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒
) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑙𝑛𝐷 + 𝛼2𝑙𝑛 (
𝑈
1−𝑈
) + 𝛼3𝑀+ 𝛼4𝑌𝑅1+ 𝛼5𝑌𝑅2+ 𝜀 (7) 
Here, D is population density, U is the urbanisation rate (also entered in logit form), M is a 
dummy variable for modernised prefectures (confined to Tokyo and Osaka in 1874 and 1890, 
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but with the addition of Aichi and Fukuoka in 1909), YR1 and YR2 are year dummies for 1890 
and 1909 respectively, and ε is a stochastic error term.  The tertiary sector share variable 
(Tshare) is defined as the proportion of tertiary sector output in the sum of primary and tertiary 
sector output, and the regression is again run with the dependent variable in logit form to deal 
with the skewness of the distribution: 
𝑙𝑛 (
𝑇𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒
1−𝑇𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒
) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑙𝑛𝐷 + 𝛼2𝑙𝑛 (
𝑈
1−𝑈
) + 𝛼3𝑀+ 𝛼4𝑌𝑅1+ 𝛼5𝑌𝑅2+ 𝜀 (8) 
The right hand side variables are the same as in equation (7), but the coefficients are allowed 
to take different values in the two sectors.  
 
 Saito and Takashima (2016) employ four different models for their regression analysis: 
a simple pooling regression model, a pooling regression model with prefectural population 
weights, a fixed effects model and a random effects model. The model selection test results 
indicate that the random effects model is preferred, so these results are presented here in Table 
7. The key explanatory variables are the population density and the urbanisation rate. The 
population density is measured in terms of the number of persons per chō in each prefecture, 
while the urbanisation rate is the number of people living in settlements of more than 10,000 
persons in a prefecture divided by the total population of that prefecture. These variables are 
respectively log and logit transformed. A dummy for modernised prefectures is added, as well 
as year dummies for 1890 and 1909. 
 
The random effects regression results for equations (7) and (8) in Table 7 yield a 
number of interesting findings. First, both population density and urbanisation were significant 
determinants of both secondary and tertiary sector activity. Second, however, the population 
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density effect was comparatively more important for the secondary sector, while the 
urbanisation effect was comparatively more important for the tertiary sector.4  
 
 The coefficients from Table 7 can be used together with national level data on 
population density and the urbanisation rate to estimate secondary and tertiary sector output 
from the data on primary sector output in Table 8. 5  Our benchmark estimates apply the 
coefficients on population density as well as the urbanisation rate for the whole period. 
However, we also consider an alternative scenario where the density effect is applied only after 
1600, as it was first noted in the context of the Tokugawa era, and it could be argued that 
population density would need to cross a threshold before having a significant effect. Primary 
sector output is first derived from agricultural output in Table 5 by making an allowance for 
forestry and fisheries. For this, the agricultural output data have been increased by 18.5 per 
cent, in line with the ratio of forestry and fisheries to agriculture in 1874. 
 
Secondary and tertiary sector real outputs in 1,000 koku are shown in Table 8A, together 
with primary sector output. Table 8C provides the growth rates of GDP and its sectoral 
components over a number of sub-periods. Over the whole period 730-1874, and also in each 
sub-period, primary output, which was dominated by agriculture, was the slowest growing 
sector. Secondary output grew a little bit faster than primary output, but tertiary output was the 
fastest growing sector over the period as a whole. Nevertheless, secondary output was the 
                                                           
4 The coefficient on the population density term was almost 4 times as large as the coefficient on the 
urbanisation term in the secondary sector equation, but was less than twice as large in the tertiary sector 
equation. 
5 The significance of the year dummies raises issues about the precision of the estimates of secondary and 
tertiary output. It is possible that the 1890 and 1909 dummies were needed because of institutional reforms 
during the Meiji period, but without further data it would not be possible to verify this. 
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fastest growing sector over the period 1721-1874, the key period of proto-industrialisation. As 
a result of these trends, we see in Table 8B that the primary sector’s share of output in rice 
equivalent terms declined from a peak of 86.7 per cent in 950 to 59.5 per cent by 1874. Over 
the same period, the secondary sector increased its share from 5.3 to 12.3 per cent and the 
tertiary sector share more than tripled from 8.1 to 28.2 per cent. 
 
 The key variables contributing to the derivation of the outputs of the secondary and 
tertiary sectors are the urbanisation rate and population density, which ultimately rely heavily 
on the population estimates. One possibility would therefore be to assume that the error margins 
are the same as for the population series. However, when considering alternative scenarios to 
the benchmark estimates in sections 6 and 7, we will also consider the possibility that the 
population density effect applies only to the period from 1600. Before then, population density 
may have been too low to stimulate the proto-industrialisation highlighted by Hayami (1967) 
during the Tokugawa period, so we consider also GDP on the basis of setting the density 
coefficients to zero before 1600. This has the effect of raising GDP before 1600 relative to the 
benchmark estimates presented in Table 8.6  
 
6. JAPANESE GDP PER CAPITA 
6.1 Benchmark estimates 
Our benchmark estimates of Japanese GDP per capita are shown in level form in Table 9A, 
and in annual growth rate form in Table 9B. The levels data are shown in terms of koku, 
                                                           
6 When the population density effect applies to the whole period, moving forwards in time from 1600 means 
growing population density, which raises secondary and tertiary shares and hence per capita income. However, 
moving backwards in time from 1600 means falling population density, which lowers secondary and tertiary 
shares and hence per capita incomes. If the population density effect is switched off before 1600, then the falling 
population density moving backwards in time no longer reduces per capita income. Hence per capita income 
before 1600 is higher than it was when the population density effect applied to the whole period. 
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combining the benchmark estimates for GDP from Table 8 with the benchmark estimates for 
population from Table 1. Using this series, Japanese GDP per capita grew at an annual rate of 
0.09 per cent between 730 and 1874, cumulating to an increase of living standards by a factor 
of 2.7.  
 
During the ancient period, the patterns of GDP per capita growth in Table 9 and 
population growth in Table 1 are consistent with the Malthusian model. Rising living standards 
occurred between 730 and 950 as population declined, while the return to population expansion 
between 950 and 1280 coincided with negative economic growth. From a low point in 1280, 
however, GDP per capita growth was persistent over the observed intervals.7 As a result, the 
transition to modern economic growth following the Meiji restoration of 1868 can be seen as 
building upon earlier episodes of growth, particularly between 1450 and 1600 in the medieval 
period and after 1721 during the Tokugawa period.  
 
  On its own, the very slow growth of GDP per capita between 1280 and 1450 in Table 
9 may at first sight seem to indicate poor economic performance. However, it needs to be 
considered against the relatively high rate of population growth in Table 1, which on the basis 
of earlier experience may reasonably have been expected to lead to negative GDP per capita 
growth. During this period, there was clear development of a commercialised economy with 
the creation of new markets and towns, improved transportation and monetisation, as well as 
the growth of large cities (Harada, 1942; Sakaehara, 1992; Niki, 1997; 2002). Associated with 
this growing commercialisation were a number of improvements in agriculture, including the 
                                                           
7 However, it seems likely from the higher frequency data on the rice wage in Figure 1 that short periods of 
shrinking or negative per capita growth continued to occur (Broadberry and Wallis, 2017). 
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use of more and better tools, the wider use of livestock, the application of fertilisers, the 
expansion of double-cropping, the introduction of high-yielding Champa rice and 
improvements in irrigation, facilitated by better organisation within self-governing villages 
(Farris, 2006: 129-139; Nishitani et al., 2017b). These improvements all occurred against a 
background of changes in the manorial system, with the development of a more direct form of 
management of the land by feudal lords. Traditionally, the land was controlled by scattered 
organisations such as temples, shrines, and aristocrats, who were based mainly in the central 
area, with multiple layers of management below the proprietor (Nishitani et al., 2017a). This 
important institutional change, which began during the fourteenth century, only came to full 
fruition during the later Warring States period. It nevertheless helped to sustain the average 
productivity of land during the late medieval period as the cultivated area expanded to meet 
the food demands of the growing population (Table 5). Also linked to the growing 
commercialisation were advances in tools and techniques in industry, which grew faster than 
agriculture (Table 8). Farris (2006: 149-150) points to improvements in carpentry, salt 
production and ceramics. 
 
Building on this wave of development, GDP per capita growth accelerated during the 
period 1450-1600, while population growth remained high (Tables 1 and 9). During this 
Warring States period, the system of direct control of the land by feudal lords, which had begun 
during the fourteenth century, spread widely as more feudal lords established a governance 
structure to avoid the collapse of their domains under the pressures of conflict (Nagahara, 
1981). Within this institutional framework, agriculture benefited from the further diffusion and 
refinement of the improvements introduced in the early medieval period, documented on a 
regional basis by Farris (2006: 222-230), so that land productivity increased together with the 
expansion of the cultivated area (Table 5). Industry also saw a number of important 
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developments, including the rapid growth of cotton cloth manufacturing, the construction of 
large stone castles and a boom in mining and metallurgy encompassing precious metals as well 
as the iron needed for the production of weapons (Farris, 2006: 242-244).8 The fastest growing 
sector was services (Table 8), with growing commercialisation at home as the feudal lords 
sought to secure food, weapons, uniforms and other supplies. There was also commercial 
expansion overseas, particularly through trade with China, with Portuguese merchants acting 
as middlemen after the suspension of friendly relations between China and Japan in 1547 
(Farris, 2009b: 180-181). This rapid growth of commercial activity was associated with a sharp 
increase in the urban share of the population (Table 6). 
 
 As in the early medieval period, the very slow growth of GDP per capita during the 
early Tokugawa period (1600-1721) needs to be considered against the backdrop of rapid 
population growth, this time at an annual rate of 0.51 per cent, substantially higher than in any 
comparably long period between 730 and 1874. Rather than viewing the slow per capita GDP 
growth on its own as a disappointing economic performance, the ability of the early Tokugawa 
economy to avoid a Malthusian collapse of living standards during pre-modern Japan’s peak 
period of population growth should thus be seen as a success, helping to pave the way for the 
transition to modern economic growth after the Meiji restoration. This is better reflected in the 
high growth rate of GDP in Table 8, driven particularly by the expansion of tertiary output. An 
important driver of this growth was the expansion of the newly built castle towns following the 
redistribution of domains among feudal lords after the Battle of Sekigahara in 1600. As a result, 
samurai were forced to live in their castle towns and the commercial and service industries that 
                                                           
8 It should of course be borne in mind that within the national accounting framework an increase in the 
production of weapons may increase GDP without increasing welfare (Kuznets, 1945).  
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catered for the consumption of the samurai prospered. Other changes encouraging the growth 
of the commercial sector included the unification of the currency system, standardisation of 
units of measurement, transport improvements such as the establishment of a national road 
system linking the whole country and developments in coastal transport, as well as the 
introduction of the murauke system of village-wide collective responsibility for tax payment 
(Miyamoto, 2004: 56-82; Iwahashi, 2004: 96-98; Hayami, 2015: 57-58; Arimoto, 2006).  
 
 The later Tokugawa period (1721-1874) saw a return to positive GDP per capita 
growth, but with relatively little population growth, so this is best seen as the final period of 
laying the foundations for modern economic growth achieved after the Meiji restoration. As 
argued by Saito and Takashima (2016), growth was driven during this period by the emergence 
of rural-centred development under the proto-industrial economy. Output growth in the 
secondary and tertiary sectors was particularly strong during the period 1846-1874, most likely 
reflecting the stimulus provided by the re-opening of Japan to trade with the western world via 
treaty ports during the 1850s.  
 
6.2 Sensitivity analysis 
There is, however, inevitably a degree of uncertainty around these estimates, so it is important 
to take account of the error margins that have been noted in earlier sections describing the 
construction of the component series, and which are pulled together here in Table 10. The 
pioneer of the subjective error margins approach was Bowley (1911-12), and it was 
subsequently taken up in the construction of historical national accounts by Chapman (1953) 
and Feinstein (1972) for the case of Britain and by Perkins (1969) for the case of China. 
Feinstein and Thomas (2002) provide a more recent statement of the case for the use of 
subjective error margins. In this approach, series are assigned reliability grades corresponding 
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to error bands. Following Feinstein (1972: 21), for firm figures (grade A), the margin of error 
around the reported series is judged to be ± less than 5%. For good estimates (grade B), the 
margin of error is ± 5% to 15%, while for rough estimates (grade C) the margin of error is ± 
15% to 25% and for conjectures (grade D) it is ± more than 25%. The subjective margins of 
error are then assumed to be held with 95 percent confidence, so that the average margin of 
error can be interpreted as two standard errors. Perkins (1969: 216) suggested an 80 percent 
confidence interval would be more appropriate for the less well documented Chinese case, 
although the statistical basis for either of these assumptions is somewhat tenuous.  
 
 The arable land estimates are assessed in Table 10B as rough estimates (grade C) during 
the ancient and medieval periods, based on the subjective error margins provided in the 
Appendix. The land productivity estimates are assessed as conjectures (grade D) in the ancient 
period, rough estimates (grade C) for the medieval period and good estimates (grade B) for the 
Tokugawa period. Agricultural output is thus graded as D in the ancient period, rising to C in 
the medieval period and B for the Tokugawa period, when agricultural output was directly 
recorded at the time. The secondary and tertiary sector estimates are highly dependent on the 
population data, which affect both the urbanisation rate and population density, so it might be 
expected that the grades for these sectors would be the same as for the population series. 
However, given the uncertainty over the timing of the population density effect discussed 
earlier, we have assigned grade C to the medieval as well as the ancient period and grade B 
rather than grade A to the Tokugawa era. Given the dominance of agriculture, the reliability 
grades for GDP and GDP per capita follow those of agricultural output. Note that the 
population series is assessed as grade C for the ancient period, thus encompassing Kito’s 
alternative estimates in Table 1. 
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 The sensitivity of Japanese GDP to perturbations of the component series is assessed in 
Table 10C. The table shows the percentage increase (decrease) in GDP in response to an 
increase (decrease) in each series by an amount equal to the average margin of error during 
each period.9 The arable land series is grade C for the ancient period, which gives an average 
error of ± 20 per cent. Perturbing the arable land by ± 20 per cent results in a change in GDP 
of ± 17.3 per cent. GDP remains almost as sensitive to an average error perturbation to the 
arable land area in the medieval period, but much less so in the Tokugawa period, as a result 
of a decline in the size of the average error and a reduction of the share of agriculture in overall 
economic activity. GDP is even more sensitive to a perturbation in land productivity during the 
ancient period. However, perturbations to secondary and tertiary output have much less effect 
on GDP largely because of the dominance of the primary sector in economic activity, 
particularly during the ancient and medieval periods.  
 
6.3 Different scenarios 
How robust is the picture of rising GDP per capita that has been painted here, given the error 
margins and sensitivity analysis presented in Table 10? Table 11 sets out a number of different 
scenarios alongside the benchmark estimates. The high and low estimates are derived on the 
basis of ± one average error for the GDP per capita series using the reliability assessments from 
Table 10, i.e ± 40% for the ancient period, ± 20% for the medieval period and ± 10% for the 
Tokugawa era. The “alternative” estimates are based on the assumption that population density 
affected the secondary and tertiary sector outputs only from 1600 onwards. The figures are 
presented in terms of 1990 international dollars, derived from Maddison (2010), but 
                                                           
9 To the extent that one is willing to accept the statistical interpretation that the error margins are held with 95 
per cent confidence, this is equal to approximately 2 standard errors. 
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incorporating some important revisions as set out in Fukao et al. (2015), which will be 
discussed in the next section. 
 
 With the benchmark estimates, Japanese GDP per capita increased by a factor of 2.7 
between 730 and 1874, or an annual rate of 0.09 per cent. Using the high estimates, GDP per 
capita increased by a smaller factor of 2.5, which translates to a growth rate of 0.08 per cent, 
while using the low estimates, GDP per capita increased by a larger factor of 3.0, or a growth 
rate of 0.1 per cent. If secondary and tertiary sector outputs are calculated on the assumption 
that the population density effects were significant only after 1600, then GDP per capita 
increased by a factor of 2.3, or an annual growth rate of 0.07 per cent. The general pattern of 
positive trend growth in Japan is therefore quite robust to all these different scenarios. Even 
starting with the high estimate in 730 and ending with the low estimate in 1874 leads to a 73 
per cent increase of GDP per capita, or an average annual growth rate of 0.05 per cent. 
 
7. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GREAT DIVERGENCE DEBATE 
7.1 An Anglo-Japanese comparison 
To pin down the timing and extent of the Great Divergence, we need to compare GDP per 
capita in Japan with Britain, where the transition to modern economic growth first occurred, 
and place the Anglo-Japanese comparison within its wider Europe-Asia context. Here, we 
project back from an estimate of GDP per capita in the late nineteenth century, expressed in 
1990 international dollars, but with some important adjustments that improve on the 1874 value 
used by Maddison (2010). Maddison’s (2010) figure for Japanese GDP per capita in 1874 was 
obtained by projecting back from a 1990 benchmark expressed at purchasing power parity in 
1990 international dollars. However, we make three important adjustments to the GDP per 
capita growth series used by Maddison to project back from 1990 to 1874. First, Settsu et al. 
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(2016) have revised downwards Japanese GDP per capita growth in constant prices during the 
period 1940-1955, by using volume data rather than deflated value data at a time of rationing, 
hyperinflation and black markets. Second, Fukao et al. (2015) have revised downwards real 
GDP per capita growth during the period 1890-1940 by improving the estimates of value added 
relative to gross output. Third, for the period 1874-1890, rather than extending the growth rate 
for the period 1885-1890 back to 1874, as Maddison did, Fukao et al. (2015) have used data 
from a reconstruction of GDP in 1874, which again has the effect of revising downwards the 
growth of real GDP per capita between 1874 and 1890. Projecting back from 1990 to 1874 
with a significantly lower growth rate results in a substantially higher level of GDP per capita 
in 1874 than suggested by Maddison.  
 
Whereas Maddison worked with the territory of the United Kingdom, Broadberry et al. 
(2015a) provide a series for Great Britain covering the period 1700-1870 and England for the 
period 1270-1700. They note that even in the Middle Ages, British levels of GDP per capita 
were well above $400 in 1990 international prices. The figure of $400, or a little more than a 
dollar a day, is usually taken as the measure of bare bones subsistence, and is observed for 
many poor countries in the twentieth century. Broadberry et al. (2015a) note that GDP per 
capita figures of well above $400 have been found for a number of west European countries in 
the late Middle Ages (van Zanden and van Leeuwen, 2012; Malanima, 2011; Alvarez-Nogal 
and Prados de la Escosura, 2013). Broadberry et al. (2015b) also find early modern India well 
above bare bones subsistence, while Broadberry et al. (2018) present estimates showing 
Chinese GDP per capita as the highest in the world during the eleventh century. Since Japan 
was the first Asian economy to achieve modern economic growth, it is of particular interest to 
establish Japan’s position in the Great Divergence. 
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Table 12 shows that, using the benchmark estimates, GDP per capita in Japan in 1280 
was 81.3 per cent of the British level. Applying the error margins from Table 10, this produces 
a range of 65.0 to 97.6 per cent. However, following the Black Death of the mid-fourteenth 
century, which wiped out around a third of the British population immediately and more than 
half by the mid-fifteenth century, British GDP per capita increased sharply. A similar increase 
in GDP per capita and in the real wage occurred across much of Europe, where the Black Death 
also sharply reduced the population. However, the Black Death did not reach Japan and there 
was accordingly no similar increase in GDP per capita there. Hence by 1450, Japanese GDP 
per capita was only around half the British level. The gap narrowed between 1450 and 1600, 
with Japan at around 60 per cent of the British level by the beginning of the seventeenth 
century. However, a surge of economic growth in Britain from the middle of the seventeenth 
century further widened the gap and Japan’s per capita GDP was only around a quarter of the 
British level by the early Meiji period. Even taking account of the error ranges, the relative 
decline of Japan over the period since 1280, and particularly since 1600 is very clear. 
 
The finding that Japanese GDP per capita in 1280 was already below the British level 
is interesting, since the two countries had similar levels of urbanisation at this time, and 
urbanisation is often used as an indicator of prosperity. One way of understanding this would 
be to see two counterbalancing forces at work. First, it seems likely that Japan had a more 
sophisticated urban culture than Britain (Farris, 2006: 81, 151-153; Rozman, 1973, 13-58; 
Astill, 2000: 46-49). Second, however, offsetting this first effect was the fact that Britain had 
an unusually large share of its agricultural sector devoted to high value added livestock farming 
(Broadberry et al., 2015a: 118). Although this did not produce more kilocalories than the 
minimum required for the population to work and reproduce, it did allow a varied diet, 
including meat, dairy produce and ale as well as the more basic grain products such as bread 
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and oatmeal. Given the importance of agriculture at the time, it is this effect which dominated, 
making per capita GDP higher in Britain than in Japan.  
 
 Another interesting finding from the benchmark estimates concerns the relatively 
modest increase in per capita agricultural output, despite the approximate doubling of per capita 
GDP between 1280 and 1874. This contrast between trends in the per capita availability of food 
and overall output, which can be seen clearly in Figure 3, reminds us that before the mid-
nineteenth century, the fruits of economic development came mainly through the greater 
availability of manufactured goods and services rather than through greater consumption of 
food.  
 
7.2 Japan in the Great Divergence  
The comparison with Britain is revealing. However, Britain was a relatively poor part of 
Europe in the eleventh century and a relatively rich part by the nineteenth century, as can be 
seen in the estimates of GDP per capita for a sample of European and Asian countries presented 
in Table 13. Before the Black Death struck in 1348, per capita incomes were substantially 
higher in Italy and Spain than in Britain and the Netherlands (Broadberry et al., 2015a; van 
Zanden and van Leeuwen, 2012; Malanima, 2011; Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura, 
2013). There then followed a substantial reversal of fortunes between the North Sea area and 
Mediterranean Europe, so that by 1800, per capita incomes were substantially higher in Britain 
and the Netherlands than in Italy and Spain. This “Little Divergence” occurred alongside the 
“Great Divergence” between Europe and Asia. 
 
Similarly, there are good reasons to believe that Japan was a relatively poor part of Asia 
in the eleventh century, but had transformed itself into the most dynamic part of the continent 
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by the nineteenth century, making the transition to modern economic growth during the Meiji 
period. Indeed, there is a substantial literature on the global economic leadership of China 
during the Northern Song and Ming dynasties, followed by decline during the Qing dynasty 
(Needham, 1954; Wittfogel, 1957; Elvin, 1973; Huang, 1985). Recent estimates of GDP per 
capita for China, also included in Table 13, are consistent with this interpretation (Broadberry 
et al., 2018). Like China, India experienced declining GDP per capita from the Mughal peak 
under Akbar, circa 1600 (Broadberry et al., 2015b). Japan did not experience a sustained 
decline in the way that both China and India did. This is in line with the strand of literature that 
has seen Japan as following an exceptional path within Asia, sharing many characteristics with 
the European path.  
 
Although the level of per capita income remained much lower in Japan than in 
northwest Europe throughout the period considered here, there are also similarities between the 
two regions in the rates of change. In Europe, British and Dutch per capita incomes showed an 
upward trend from the late medieval period while economies in the rest of the continent 
stagnated or declined, bringing about a European Little Divergence. In Asia, Japanese per 
capita incomes trended upwards from the medieval period while the rest of the continent 
stagnated or declined, bringing about an Asian Little Divergence. Of course, the similarities 
between Britain and the North Sea area should not be overstated; Japan was starting from a 
much lower level of GDP per capita than Britain and the Netherlands, and the trend growth 
was also significantly slower in Japan. The transition to modern economic growth thus 
occurred first in the North Sea area in the form of the British Industrial Revolution, which then 
spread fairly quickly to other high income parts of Europe. Within Asia, as Japan was 
improving its position relative to China and India, however, it was also falling further behind 
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Britain until the Meiji restoration of 1868 and the institutional reforms which ushered in Asia’s 
first case of modern economic growth.  
 
 Finally, it is worth noting the differences arising from the use of contemporary data 
compared with Maddison’s reliance on conjecture controlled by the largely qualitative 
literature. Panel B of Table 13 reports Maddison’s (2010) estimates of GDP per capita in 1990 
international dollars over the same period. Maddison reports fewer data points, but it is 
nevertheless clear that there are significant differences. First, notice that all the studies of 
European economies based on the systematic use of contemporary data indicate a much higher 
level of GDP per capita in the medieval period than Maddison’s conjectures. Maddison’s series 
refers to the territory of the United Kingdom, which includes Ireland as well as Great Britain, 
but this can account for only a very small part of the difference between Maddison’s conjecture 
that the British lived at bare bones subsistence of $400 in 1000 and the figure of $723 in 1086 
derived from the Domesday survey. Furthermore, Maddison’s conjecture that the British 
economy grew at the same rate between 1500 and 1700 as between 1700 and 1830 produces a 
much lower figure for per capita GDP in 1500 than Broadberry et al.’s (2015) figure based on 
direct estimation from output data. Similarly, Maddison’s conjectures for the Netherlands, Italy 
and Spain result in substantially lower levels of GDP per capita in the medieval period. Second, 
Maddison’s estimates for Asia suggest a relatively modest economic performance in the 
medieval and early modern periods, with China’s per capita GDP peaking at $600. By contrast, 
the studies based on contemporary data suggest China achieving a per capita GDP of more than 
$1,000 in peak years during both the Northern Song and Ming dynasties, and India with a per 
capita income of almost $700 at the time of Akbar. For the case of Japan, the GDP per capita 
series from this study remains above Maddison’s series throughout the period 1000-1874. The 
largest difference with Maddison’s estimates can be seen in the Tokugawa and early Meiji 
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periods, as a result of the revisions to the Japanese GDP series by Fukao et al. (2015) and Settsu 
et al. (2016).  
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper provides estimates of Japanese GDP per capita for the period 730-1874, constructed 
from the output side, using methods developed for the estimation of GDP per capita in medieval 
and early modern Europe, but amended to suit Japanese circumstances and data. Our estimates 
for the agricultural sector are built up from direct estimates of arable land use and land 
productivity, and checked against trends in agricultural demand derived from the grain wages 
of unskilled labourers. Activity in the secondary and tertiary sectors is quantified using 
techniques developed originally in the context of Europe, but again amended to suit Japanese 
circumstances and data availability. As well as linking the growth of non-agricultural output to 
the urbanisation ratio, a role is identified for population density during the proto-industrial 
phase of the Tokugawa period.  
 
The resulting estimates, which are subjected to reliability assessments and sensitivity 
analysis, suggest that Japan experienced substantial per capita income growth before 1868, 
which provided a foundation for the transition to modern economic growth after the Meiji 
Restoration. The central estimates are consistent with Malthusian fluctuations during the 
ancient period, between 730 and 1280, with a negative relationship between population and per 
capita income levels. After 1280, the central estimates suggest positive trend growth of per 
capita income, with growth concentrated in two periods, 1450-1600 and after 1721. However, 
the wider error bands during the medieval period mean that this early phase of growth is less 
secure than the Tokugawa period growth. This is not to suggest that Japan would have made 
that transition to modern economic growth without the institutional reforms of the Meiji period. 
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It does, however, link to an earlier literature emphasising Japan’s exceptional path within Asia, 
sharing many characteristics with the European path. But since Japan started at a lower level 
than Britain and grew more slowly until the Meiji Restoration, the Great Divergence occurred 
as the most dynamic part of Asia fell behind the most dynamic part of Europe. 
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TABLE 1: Total population of Japan, 730-1874 
 
A. Level in millions  
Year 
Average 
population Minimum Maximum 
Alternative 
estimates 
730 6.1 5.8 6.4 4.5 
950 5.0 4.4 5.6 6.4 
1150 5.9 5.5 6.3 6.8 
1280 6.0 5.7 6.2  
1450 10.1 9.6 10.5  
1600 17.0 16.2 17.8  
1721 31.3 29.7 32.9  
1804 30.7 29.2 32.2  
1846 32.2 30.6 33.8  
1874 34.5 32.8 36.2  
 
B. Annual growth rates (% per year) 
Years 
Average 
population 
Alternative 
estimates 
730-950 -0.09 0.16 
950-1150 0.08 0.03 
1150-1280 0.01 -0.10 
1280-1450 0.31  
1450-1600 0.35  
1600-1721 0.51  
1721-1804 -0.02  
1804-1846 0.12  
1846-1874 0.25  
   
730-1280 0.00 0.05 
1280-1721 0.38 0.38 
1721-1874 0.06 0.06 
730-1874 0.15 0.18 
 
Sources and notes: Main series: 730–1600: Farris (2006, 2009a), Saito and Takashima (2017a). 
1721–1846: Kito (1996; 2000). 1874: Fukao et al. (2015). Alternative estimates for 730–1150: 
Kito (1996; 2000). For 730 and 950 we show Kito’s estimates for 725 and 900, respectively. 
Estimates for all years exclude Ezochi and Ryūkyū (present-day Hokkaido and Okinawa 
prefectures). The population for 1874 including Hokkaido and Okinawa was 34.8 million. 
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TABLE 2: Estimated arable land, land productivity, and agricultural output in the ancient period, 730-1150 
 
 
 Arable land (1,000 chō)  
Land productivity 
(koku/chō)  Agricultural output (1,000 koku) 
 Paddy Non-paddy Total  Paddy Non-paddy  Paddy Non-paddy Total 
Nara period 458-590 39-192 497-782  7.94-12.64 4.88-7.82  3,639–7,465 191–1,501 3,830–8,966 
(730) (524) (116) (640)  (10.29) (6.35)  (5,397) (734) (6,130) 
Early Heian period 591-633 218-613 809-1,246  5.83-14.59 3.12-7.82  3,451–9,234 682–4,796 4,133–14,030 
(950) (612) (416) (1,028)  (10.21) (5.47)  (6,252) (2,276) (8,527) 
Late Heian period 639-705 353-522 992-1,227  6.29-13.68 3.62-7.82  4,024–9,640 1,275–4,079 5,299–13,719 
(1150) (672) (438) (1,109)  (9.98) (5.72)  (6,711) (2,500) (9,211) 
 
Notes and sources: Appendix Table A9B. All figures are expressed in Tokugawa units. Figures in parentheses are average values. The arable land area and land 
productivity have been adjusted for fallowed and abandoned land. For further details, see text and appendix.  
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TABLE 3: Estimated arable land, land productivity, and agricultural output in the 
medieval period 
 
 Arable land 
(1,000 chō) 
Land 
productivity 
(koku/chō) 
Agricultural 
output 
(1,000 koku) 
Population 
(millions) 
Agricultural 
output per 
head (koku) 
1280 1,276 6.49 8,278 6.0 1.39 
1450 1,621 8.60 13,938 10.1 1.39 
 
Sources and notes: Appendix Table A22. All figures are in Tokugawa units. For further details, 
see text and appendix. 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4: Estimates of arable land, land productivity, agricultural output, and 
primary sector output in the Tokugawa and early Meiji periods, 1600-1874 
 
 
Arable land 
(1,000 chō) 
Land productivity 
(koku/chō) 
Agricultural output 
(1,000 koku) 
Primary sector output 
(1,000 koku) 
1600 2,497 10.36 25,879 30,678 
1721 3,249 12.67 41,173 48,808 
1804 3,892 12.74 49,604 58,803 
1846 4,265 13.26 56,571 67,062 
1874 4,533 14.31 64,861 76,351 
 
Sources and notes: Agricultural output for 1600–1846 is calculated using the share of forestry- 
and fishery-sector output in total output in early Meiji Japan taken from Fukao et al. (2015). 
Hokkaido and Okinawa are included in 1874. All figures are in Tokugawa units. For further 
details, see text and appendix. 
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TABLE 5: Japanese agricultural production, 730-1874: the benchmark estimates 
 
A. Levels 
 
Arable land  
(1000 chō) 
Land 
productivity 
(koku/chō) 
Agricultural 
output 
(1000 koku) 
Agricultural 
output per 
head (koku) 
Agricultural 
output per 
head 
(1874=100) 
730 640 9.58 6,130 1.00 54.0 
950 1,028 8.30 8,527 1.71 91.6 
1150 1,109 8.31 9,211 1.56 83.9 
1280 1,276 6.49 8,278 1.39 74.7 
1450 1,621 8.60 13,938 1.39 74.5 
1600 2,497 10.36 25,879 1.52 81.8 
1721 3,249 12.67 41,173 1.32 70.7 
1804 3,892 12.74 49,604 1.62 86.8 
1846 4,265 13.26 56,571 1.76 94.3 
1874 4,533 14.31 64,861 1.86 100.0 
 
B. Annual growth rates (% per year 
 
Arable land 
Land 
productivity 
Agricultural 
output 
Agricultural 
output per 
head 
730-950 0.22 -0.07 0.15 0.24 
950-1150 0.04 0.00 0.04 -0.04 
1150-1280 0.11 -0.19 -0.08 -0.09 
1280-1450 0.14 0.17 0.31 0.00 
1450-1600 0.29 0.12 0.41 0.06 
1600-1721 0.22 0.17 0.38 -0.12 
1721-1804 0.22 0.01 0.22 0.25 
1804-1846 0.22 0.10 0.31 0.20 
1846-1874 0.22 0.27 0.49 0.21 
      
730-1280 0.13 -0.07 0.05 0.06 
1280-1721 0.21 0.15 0.36 -0.01 
1721-1874 0.22 0.08 0.30 0.23 
730-1874 0.17 0.04 0.21 0.05 
 
Sources and notes: All figures are in Tokugawa units. See discussion in the text and appendix. 
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FIGURE 1: Japanese unskilled rice wage and agricultural demand per capita, 1260/69-
1850/59 (koku, log scale) 
 
 
 
Sources and notes: Daily unskilled rice wage from Bassino et al. (2010), Bassino and Ma 
(2005): 1262-1583: constructed using information reported in Momose (1959), Rekihaku 
(2009), Kyoto Daigaku Kinsei Bukkashi Kenkyukai (1962), Endo (1956) and Tanaka (2007). 
1600-1780: generated using information in Miyamoto, 1963), Iwahashi (1981) and (Kimura 
1987). 1793-1862: derived from Mitsui (Mitsui Bunko 1981). Annual rice wage based on 250 
days worked per year, and 150 kg per koku. See text for details. Agricultural demand per capita: 
see text. 
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FIGURE 2: Per capita supply of and demand for agricultural products, 730/39-1870/79 
(koku) 
 
 
 
Sources and notes: See text. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 6: Urban population and population density in Japan, 730-1873 
 
 
Urban 
population 
(1,000) 
Total 
population 
(millions) 
Urban 
 share 
(%) 
Population 
density 
(persons per 
chō) 
730 124 6.1 2.0 0.21 
950 135 5.0 2.7 0.17 
1150 120 5.9 2.0 0.20 
1280 208 6.0 3.5 0.21 
1450 259 10.1 2.6 0.35 
1600 1,088 17.0 6.4 0.59 
1721 3,956 31.3 12.6 1.09 
1804 3,936 30.7 12.8 1.06 
1846 3,961 32.2 12.3 1.12 
1874 3,588 34.5 10.4 1.20 
 
Sources and notes: The urban population data for Japan excluding Ezochi and Ryūkyū 
(present-day Hokkaido and Okinawa) are taken from Kito (1996), Farris (2009a), and Saito 
and Takashima (2015; 2017b). They include persons living in settlements of at least 10,000 
persons. The total population data are taken from Table 1. The land area of Japan excluding 
Hokkaido and Okinawa is 28.8 million chō. 
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TABLE 7: Determinants of sectoral shares: random effects regression results, 1874, 
1890 and 1909 
 
 Secondary 
sector 
Tertiary 
sector 
Population density 0.460*** 0.538*** 
(log) (4.65) (6.97) 
Urbanisation rate 0.122* 0.310*** 
(logit) (1.92) (6.26) 
Prefectural dummy  0.775*** 0.307** 
 (3.84) (1.96) 
Year 1890 dummy 0.447*** 0.388*** 
 (7.38) (8.29) 
Year 1909 dummy 0.743*** 0.428*** 
 (10.11) (7.52) 
Constant -1.557*** -0.319** 
 (-8.48) (-2.24) 
No. of observations 135 135 
No. of groups 45 45 
Adjusted R2 0.740 0.835 
 
Sources and notes: Saito and Takashima (2016: 379). 
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TABLE 8: Japanese GDP by main output categories, 730-1874, benchmark estimates  
 
A. Levels of GDP (1,000 koku) 
 
Primary 
output 
Secondary 
output 
Tertiary 
output GDP  
730 7,267 466 689 8,422 
950 10,108 613 943 11,664 
1150 10,919 690 1,017 12,626 
1280 9,813 666 1,091 11,571 
1450 16,523 1,374 2,209 20,106 
1600 30,678 3,652 7,306 41,635 
1721 48,808 8,434 20,361 77,603 
1804 58,803 10,091 24,402 93,296 
1846 67,062 11,698 28,140 106,900 
1874 76,351 15,782 36,043 128,176 
 
B. Sectoral shares of GDP (%) 
 
Primary 
output 
Secondary 
output 
Tertiary 
output GDP  
730 86.3 5.5 8.2 100.0 
950 86.7 5.3 8.1 100.0 
1150 86.5 5.5 8.1 100.0 
1280 84.8 5.8 9.4 100.0 
1450 82.2 6.8 11.0 100.0 
1600 73.7 8.8 17.5 100.0 
1721 62.9 10.9 26.2 100.0 
1804 63.0 10.8 26.2 100.0 
1846 62.7 10.9 26.3 100.0 
1874 59.6 12.3 28.1 100.0 
 
C. Growth rates of GDP (% per year) 
 Primary 
output 
Secondary 
output 
Tertiary 
output GDP  
730-950 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.15 
950-11500 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.04 
1150-1280 -0.08 -0.03 0.05 -0.07 
1280-1450 0.31 0.43 0.42 0.33 
1450-1600 0.41 0.65 0.80 0.49 
1600-1721 0.38 0.69 0.85 0.52 
1721-1804 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 
1804-1846 0.31 0.35 0.34 0.32 
1846-1874 0.46 1.08 0.89 0.65 
     
730-1280 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.06 
1280-1721 0.36 0.58 0.67 0.43 
1721-1874 0.29 0.41 0.37 0.33 
730-1874 0.21 0.31 0.35 0.24 
 
48 
Sources and notes: Primary output is derived from agricultural output in Table 2, as explained 
in the text. Secondary and tertiary output before 1874 are derived using data on the urbanisation 
rate and population density together with the regression coefficient from Table 4, as described 
in the text.  
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 9: Japanese GDP per capita, 730-1874, benchmark estimates 
 
A. Level of GDP per capita  
GDP 
(1,000 koku) 
Population 
(million) 
GDP per 
capita 
(koku) 
GDP per 
capita 
(1874=100) 
730 8,422 6.1 1.38 37.2 
950 11,664 5.0 2.33 62.8 
1150 12,626 5.9 2.14 57.6 
1280 11,571 6.0 1.94 52.4 
1450 20,106 10.1 2.00 53.9 
1600 41,635 17.0 2.45 66.0 
1721 77,603 31.3 2.48 66.8 
1804 93,296 30.7 3.04 81.9 
1846 106,900 32.2 3.32 89.4 
1874 128,176 34.8 3.71 100.0 
 
B. Annual growth rates of GDP per capita 
 Growth rate 
(% per year) 
730-950 0.24 
950-1150 -0.04 
1150-1280 -0.07 
1280-1450 0.02 
1450-1600 0.13 
1600-1721 0.01 
1721-1804 0.25 
1804-1846 0.21 
1846-1874 0.40 
  
730-1280 0.06 
1280-1721 0.06 
1721-1874 0.26 
730-1874 0.09 
 
Sources and notes: GDP from Table 8, population from Table 1.  
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TABLE 10: Data reliability assessments and sensitivity analysis 
 
A. Data reliability grades 
Reliability grade Margin of error Average  
margin of error 
A. Firm figures ± less than 5% ± 2.5% 
B. Good figures ± 5% to 15% ± 10% 
C. Rough estimates ± 15% to 25% ± 20% 
D. Conjectures ± more than 25% ± 40% 
 
B. Reliability assessments for Japanese data 
 Ancient Medieval Tokugawa 
Primary output    
Arable land C C A 
Land productivity D C B 
Rice wage  C B 
Agricultural output D C B 
Secondary & tertiary output    
Secondary output C C B 
Tertiary output C C B 
Aggregates    
GDP D C B 
Population C B A 
GDP per capita D C B 
 
C. Sensitivity analysis for Japanese GDP 
 Ancient Medieval Tokugawa 
Arable land ± 17.3% ± 16.7% ± 1.6% 
Land productivity ± 35.2% ± 16.7% ± 6.5% 
Secondary output ± 5.8% ± 1.3% ± 1.2% 
Tertiary output ± 6.4% ± 2.0% ± 2.6% 
 
Sources: error margins derived from the range of estimates produced from alternative sources 
and the volatility of the underlying data, as described in the text. The interpretation of the 
reliability grades is from Feinstein (1972: 21). Sensitivity analysis shows the percentage 
increase (decrease) in GDP in response to an increase (decrease) in each series by an amount 
equal to the average margin of error during each period.  
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TABLE 11: Different scenarios for Japanese GDP per capita ($1990) 
 
 Benchmark 
estimates 
High 
estimates 
Low 
estimates 
Alternative 
estimates 
730 376 526 (300) 438 
950 635 889 381 757 
1150 583 816 350 680 
1280 529 635 423 629 
1450 545 654 436 614 
1600 667 734 600 667 
1721 675 743 608 675 
1804 828 911 745 828 
1846 903 993 813 903 
1874 1,011 1,112 910 1,011 
 
Sources and notes: Benchmark estimate from Table 9, converted to 1990 international dollars 
at 1874 from Fukao et al. (2015). Hokkaido and Okinawa are included in 1874. High and low 
estimates are calculated using ± one average error, based on the reliability assessments in Table 
10. The low estimate of $300 for 730 is given in parentheses, since the figure of $226 suggested 
by a mechanical application of the error bands would be too low to sustain life. Alternative 
estimates are based on the assumption that population density affected the secondary and 
tertiary sector outputs only from 1600 onwards. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 12: An Anglo-Japanese comparison of per capita GDP, 730-1874 
 
 Japan p.c. 
GDP, 
benchmark 
estimates 
($1990) 
GB p.c. 
GDP 
($1990) 
Japan/GB 
p.c. GDP, 
benchmark 
estimates 
(GB=100) 
Range for 
Japan/GB 
p.c. GDP 
(GB=100) 
730 376    
950 635    
1150 583    
1280 529 651 81.3 65.0 - 97.6 
1450 545 1,011 53.9 43.1 - 64.7 
1600 667 1,077 61.9 55.7 – 68.1 
1721 675 1,605 42.1 37.9 – 46.3 
1804 828 2,080 39.8 35.8 – 43.8 
1846 903 2,997 30.1 27.1 – 33.1 
1874 1,011 4,191 24.1 21.7 – 26.5 
 
Sources and notes: Japanese GDP per capita from Table 9, converted to 1990 international 
dollars at 1874 from Fukao et al. (2015).; GB GDP per capita from Broadberry et al. (2015a), 
benchmarked at 1850 using Maddison (2010), but adjusted from the territory of the United 
Kingdom to a Great Britain basis. Range calculated using the average error from the reliability 
assessment for Japanese GDP per capita in Table 10. 
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FIGURE 3: Japanese agricultural output and GDP per capita, 730/39-1870/79 (koku) 
 
 
 
Sources and notes: Agricultural output per capita from Table 5; GDP per capita from Table 9. 
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TABLE 13: GDP per capita levels in Europe and Asia, 730-1870 (1990 international 
dollars) 
 
A. Studies based on contemporary data 
 GB NL Italy Spain Japan China India 
730     376   
950     635   
980      853  
1020      1,006  
1050      967  
1086 723     878  
1120      863  
1150     583   
1280 651   897 529   
1300 724  1,466 889    
1348 745 674 1,327 957    
1400 1,045 958 1,570 822  1,032  
1450 1,011 1,102 1,657 827 545 990  
1500 1,068 1,141 1,408 826  858  
1570 1,096 1,372 1,325 919  885  
1600 1,077 1,825 1,224 876 667 865 682 
1650 1,055 1,671 1,372 838   638 
1700 1,563 1,849 1,344 817  1,103 622 
1720 1,605 1,751 1,564 850 675 950  
1750 1,710 1,877 1,446 845  727 573 
1800 2,080 1,974 1,327 893 828 614 569 
1850 2,997 2,397 1,306 1,144 903 600 556 
1870 3,856 2,849 1,470 1,486 1,011 618 526 
 
B. Maddison 
 UK NL Italy Spain Japan China India 
1000 400 425 450 450 425 466 450 
1500 714 761 1,100 661 500 600 550 
1600 974 1,381 1,100 853 520 600 550 
1700 1,250 2,130 1,100 853 570 600 550 
1820 1,706 1,838 1,117 1,008 669 600 533 
1850 2,330 2,371 1,350 1,079 679 600 533 
1870 3,031 2,757 1,499 1,207 756 530 533 
 
Sources: Part A: Britain: Broadberry et al. (2015a); Walker (2014); Netherlands: van Zanden 
and van Leuwen (2012); Italy: Malanima (2011); Spain: Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la 
Escosura (2013); Japan: Table 11; China: Broadberry et al. (2018); India: Broadberry et al. 
(2015b). Part B: Maddison (2010). 
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